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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROLAND WEBB, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC., a Utah 
corporation, WILLIAM REAGAN, 
individually, and WILLIAM 
ADAMS, ESQ., individually, 
and DOUGLAS T. HALL, ESQ., 
individually, 
Defendants-Appellants 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND CASE HISTORY 
Jurisdiction lies with this Court pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1989). This appeal has been poured over 
to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to an order from the Utah 
Supreme Court. This appeal is taken from the final order entered 
by the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, the 
Honorable James Sawaya presiding, granting summary judgment and 
dismissing the fourth cause of action of defendant R.O.A. General, 
Inc.fs counterclaim. The court's order of January 5, 1989 has been 
certified as a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
No. 890164-CA 
Category 14(b) 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err in failing to hold that Utah 
Code Ann. §78-12-27 was the applicable statute of limitation? 
2. Did the trial court err in determining that the 
plaintiff-respondent had not waived his right to rely on the 
applicable statute of limitations? 
3. Did the trial court err in determining that genuine 
issues of material fact did not exist as to the adequacy of the 
disclosure allegedly made by plaintiff-respondent before taking 
advantage of a corporate opportunity? 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-27, U.R.C.P. 9(h) and 56 are 
determinative. The text of each provision is set forth in the 
Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-respondent, Roland Webb, at all pertinent times, 
until July, 1981, served as a director and president of Galaxy 
Outdoor Advertising, Inc. ("Galaxy Advertising"). (R. 559, 828, 
1022 at p. 24) In February, 1977, the board of directors of Galaxy 
Advertising consisted of five individuals, including Webb. (Id.) 
Prior to February, 1977, Galaxy Advertising entered into 
negotiations to sell its Wyoming division to one of its employees, 
Eldon Palmer. (R. 560, 1023 at p. 8) Webb handled all of the 
negotiations with Eldon Palmer on behalf of Galaxy Advertising. 
(R. 1022 at p. 25) During the negotiations for the sale of the 
Wyoming division, unknown to the Galaxy Advertising's board of 
directors, Eldon Palmer offered to give Webb an option to acquire 
51% of Palmer Outdoor Advertising, Inc. in exchange for certain 
considerations. (Id. at pp. 27, 60) On or about February 10, 
1987, Galaxy Advertising's board of directors approved the sale of 
the Wyoming division to Palmer Outdoor Advertising, Inc. (R. 560) 
Following the sale of the Wyoming division of Galaxy 
Advertising, Webb obtained a 51% equity interest in Palmer Outdoor 
Advertising, Inc. for only nominal consideration. (R. 1022 at pp. 
20-22, 69-72) (Id. at pp. 20-22, 70-72) Although Webb maintains 
that he made a full and adequate disclosure of his pending interest 
in Palmer Outdoor Advertising, Inc., substantial evidence was 
presented to the trial court that Webb never disclosed to the board 
of directors of Galaxy Advertising that he had an option to 
purchase a majority interest in Palmer Outdoor Advertising prior to 
Galaxy's sale of its Wyoming division. (icL at pp. 62, 73, 75; R. 
1023 at pp. 32-35) 
Approximately three years after purchasing a majority 
interest in Palmer Outdoor Advertising, Inc., Webb sold his 
interest in the company for $3,050,000. (R. 1022 at p. 72) 
On or about July 7, 1981, defendant-appellant R.O.A. 
acquired Galaxy Outdoor Advertising. (R. 689-90) 
On or about May 28, 1987, Roland Webb brought the instant 
action in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County 
asserting several causes of action against defendants. (R. 2-20, 
33-78) Defendant-appellant R.O.A. thereafter filed a counterclaim 
seeking to recover damages for Webb's alleged breach of a fiduciary 
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duty while a director of Galaxy Advertising. The fourth cause of 
action of R.O.A. agajnst Webb asserted that Webb had improperly 
usurped a corporate opportunity from Galaxy Advertising when he 
obtained his interest in Palmer Outdoor Advertising. (R. 202-72) 
Webb failed to raise the limitation period in Utah Code Ann. 
§78-12-27 as an affirmative defense in his answer to defendant's 
counterclaim. (R. 292-99) 
Webb later moved for partial summary judgment on the 
claim of usurpation of a corporate opportunity on two grounds: (1) 
that the claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitation, 
and (2) that he had made adequate disclosure to the board of 
directors of Galaxy Advertising prior to taking advantage of the 
corporation opportunity. (R. 580-88) Defendant-appellant R.O.A. 
resisted Webb's motion claiming that he had waived any right to 
rely on the applicable statute of limitations, and that genuine 
issues of material fact existed as to the adequacy of the 
disclosure allegedly made by Webb. (R. 828-37) 
Oral argument on Webb's motion for partial summary 
judgment occurred on August 1, 1988. The Honorable James S. 
Sawaya, District Judge, issued a minute entry on August 30, 1988, 
finding that the facts under which the defendants' fourth cause of 
action arose existed and were known by R.O.A.fs predecessor in 
1977, and that, as a result, the claim for usurpation of corporate 
opportunity was barred by the applicable statute of limitation. 
(R. 838) On or about September 19, 1988, R.O.A. moved the trial 
court pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
to certify the court's order granting Webb's motion for partial 
summary judgment as a final appealable order. (R. 841-42) On or 
about January 5, 1989, the trial court entered its order of partial 
summary judgment, dismissing R.O.A.'s cause of action for 
usurpation of a corporate opportunity, and certifying the same as a 
final order pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(R. 870-71) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in failing to find the applicable 
statute of limitation on R.O.A.'s counterclaim for Webb's 
usurpation of corporate opportunity was Utah Code Ann. §78-12-27. 
The trial court further erred in failing to find that Webb had 
waived his right to rely on the statute limitation defense due to 
Webb's failure to affirmatively assert the defense in his answer to 
R.O.A.'s counterclaim. Furthermore, the trial court committed 
error in failing to find that genuine issues of material fact 
existed as to the nature and adequacy of Webb's disclosure to the 
board of directors of Galaxy Advertising. The existence of such 
genuine issues of material fact should have precluded the trial 
court from entering partial summary judgment in favor of Webb on 
R.O.A.'s counterclaim for usurpation of the corporate opportunity. 
-R-
ARGUMENT 
POINT I, 
UTAH CODE ANN. §78-12-27 APPLIES TO R.O.A.'S 
COUNTERCLAIM FOR USURPATION OF A CORPORATE 
OPPORTUNITY. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-27 provides the applicable statute 
of limitation for actions brought against corporate stockholders 
or directors: 
Actions against directors or stockholers of 
corporations to recover a penalty or 
forfeiture imposed, or to enforce a 
liability created, by law must be brought 
within three years after the discovery, by 
the aggrieved party, of the facts upon which 
the penalty or forfeiture attached, or the 
liability accrued, and in case of actions 
against stockholders of a bank pursuant to 
levy of assessment to collect their 
statutory liability, such actions must be 
brought within three years after the levy of 
the assessment. 
The "liability" referred to under Utah Code Ann. §78-12-27 is that 
liability arising out of the mere fact of being a corporate 
director or stockholder. American Theatre Co. v. Glasmann, 95 
Utah 303, 80 P.2d 922 (1938). 
In the instant appeal, it is undisputed that Roland Webb 
was a director and officer of Galaxy Advertising at the time of 
the sale of its Wyoming division to Eldon Palmer. Before the 
trial court, Webb contended that R.O.A.'s failure to refer to him 
as a "officer", rather than as a "director", of Galaxy 
Advertising, rendered Utah Code Ann. §78-12-27 inapplicable. 
However, it is interesting to note that Webb himself claimed in 
his initial memorandum in support of his motion that Utah Code 
_ 6 _ 
Ann. §78-12-27 was the applicable limitation period. (R. 585-87) 
Webb's position that Utah Code Ann. §78-12-27 applies only to 
suits against individuals specifically referred to as corporate 
"directors or shareholders" is untenable. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Grosgean v. Ross, 572 P.2d 1383 
(Utah 1977), analyzed the nature of the liability imposed under 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-27. In Grosgean, the plaintiff brought an 
action to recover for the value of services rendered to the 
defendants and for fraud. The trial court dismissed the action, 
finding the action time barred by Utah Code Ann. §78-12-27. The 
Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court's actions on the 
ground that Utah Code Ann. §78-12-27 did not apply because the 
case did not arise out of the defendants' relationship to the 
corporation as directors or stockholders: 
The courts have rather uniformly held under 
statutes such as this that the sections 
refer to such liabilities as arise from or 
grow out of the fact of being a director or 
stockholder, a liability founded upon the 
fact of, or imposed because of, the 
relationship of being a stockholder or 
director. 
Id. at 1384 (quoting American Theatre Co. v. Glassman, 95 Utah 
303, 80 P.2d 922 (1938) ) . 
R.O.A.'s apparent technical omission to specifically 
refer to Webb as a corporate "director" in its counterclaim should 
not influence this Court's ruling as to the applicable statute of 
limitation. It is well established that the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure were intended to do away with such technical pleading 
requirements. See Williams v. State Farm Insurance Co., 656 P.2d 
966 (Utah 1981) (the fundamental purpose of the liberalized 
pleading rules is to afford parties the privilege of presenting 
whatever legitimate contentions they have, subject only to the 
requirement that their adversary be given fair notice of the 
nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication 
of the type of litigation involved). See also, U.R.C.P. 8(f). 
Under the liberalized pleading requirements of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Webb is not entitled to rely upon the 
fact that he was not specifically named as a corporate "director" 
in R.O.A.'s counterclaim. While there are technical legal 
distinctions between being a corporate "officer" and a corporate 
"director", the terms for purposes of pleading should be 
considered to be nearly synonymous. This is especially true in 
the instant case, where Webb was both an officer and a director of 
Galaxy Advertising. Webb testified in his own deposition as 
follows: 
Q. Okay. What was your position with 
Galaxy? 
A. I was the president. 
Q. Were you on their board of directors? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What was your position on the board? 
A. What was my position on the board? 
Q. Yes. 
A. I was president. 
(R. 1022 at p. 12) 
R.O.A.'s counterclaim clearly gave plaintiff adequate 
notice of the nature, basis and grounds of R.O.A.'s claims against 
him. Even a casual reading of R.O.A.'s counterclaim reveals that 
R.O.A. intended to seek recovery for plaintiff for breach of a 
fiduciary duty by improperly taking advantage of a corporate 
opportunity. While R.O.A.'s counterclaim could have perhaps been 
more artfully and technically drafted, the averments found in that 
counterclaim clearly fall within the scope of Utah Code Ann. 
§78-12-27. Furthermore, it stands to reason that the 
applicability of the statute of limitation for corporate director 
liability should depend more on the relationshp out of which the 
action arises rather than the terminology used by the parties in 
their pleadings. As a result, this court should find that the 
applicable statute of limitation to R.O.A.'s fourth cause of 
action is Utah Code Ann. §78-12-27. 
POINT II. 
WEBB HAS WAIVED ANY RIGHT TO RELY ON THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATION SET FORTH IN UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED §78-12-27 (1953). 
It is fundamental under the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure that a party intending to rely on the protections of a 
statute of limitation must specifically plead the statute upon 
which he is relying. U.R.C.P. 9(h) provides: 
In pleading the statute of limitations it is 
not necessary to state the facts showing the 
defense but it may be alleged generally that 
the cause of action is barred by the 
provisions of the statute relied on, 
referring to or describing such statutes 
specifically and definitively by section 
number, subsection designation, if any, or 
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otherwise designating the provision relied 
upon sufficiently clearly to identify it. 
If such allegation is controverted, the 
party pleading the statute must establish, 
on the trial, the facts showing that the 
cause of action is so barred. (Emphasis 
added). 
Public policy favors the right of action, rather than the 
right of limitations. Slade v. Slade, 81 N.M. 462, 468 P.2d 627 
(1970). As a result, this Court should construe the law and facts 
in a light most favorable to the party seeking to enforce its 
right of action, rather than in favor of the party relying on a 
statute of limitation. Safeco Insurance Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 
639 P.2d 996 (Alaska 1981). 
The Utah Supreme Court has on numerous occasions held 
that a party may be barred from relying on a statute of limitation 
defense which has not been specifically pleaded. In Wasatch 
Mines Co. v. Hopkinson, 24 Utah 2d 70, 465 P.2d 1007 (1970), the 
court was asked to consider the sufficiency of a defendant's 
general plea of the statute of limitations. The plaintiff brought 
action to recover certain monies due from the defendant on the 
purchase of soil removed from the plaintiff's property. The 
defendant pleaded a statute of limitations defense without 
designating what sections of the statute or statutes upon which he 
relied. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's claim on the 
ground that it was barred by the statute of limitations. 
In reversing and remanding the action back to the trial 
court, the Utah Supreme Court held that the defendant's general 
plea of the statute of limitations was not in accordance with 
U.R.C.P. 9(h), As a result, the defendant's statute of 
limitations defense was not considered pertinent on appeal. 
Wasatch Mines, 465 P.2d at 1010-11. See also, American Theatre 
Co. v. Glasmann, 95 Utah 303, 80 P.2d 922 (1938) (the court held 
that the defendant's failure to specifically plead the statute of 
limitation for actions against corporate directors barred the 
defendant's right to rely on the statute of limitation defense). 
In the instant action, Webb raised the following second 
affirmative defense to R.O.A.'s counterclaim: 
34. Defendant's counterclaims are barred, 
in whole or in part, by the applicable 
statutes of limitations, including, but not 
limited to, Utah Code Annotated §78-12-23, 
25 and 26. 
(R. 297) 
Webb's failure to raise the limitation defense found in 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-27 constitutes a waiver of that defense. At 
the trial court level, Webb defended himself against R.O.A.'s 
counterclaim for more than a year without ever raising Utah Code 
Ann. §78-12-27 as a defense. To permit Webb at this late 
juncture, following extensive litigation and discovery, to rely 
upon this defense is unwarranted. 
POINT III. 
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT REMAIN AS TO 
WHETHER WEBB MADE A FULL AND COMPLETE 
DISCLOSURE OF THE CORPORATE OPPORTUNITY. 
Assuming arguendo that Webb has not waived his right to 
rely on the defense afforded him under Utah Code Ann. §78-12-27, 
or any other limitation period, genuine issues of material fact 
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existed as to the nature of the disclosure allegedly made by Webb 
to the corporate directors of Galaxy Advertising. As a general 
rule, statutes of limitations, including Utah Code Ann. §78-12-27, 
do not begin to run until a party has notice of the wrongs 
committed against him. See, Jones Mining Co. v. Cardiff Mining & 
Milling Co., 56 Utah 449, 191 P. 426, 429 (1920). As previously 
indicated, genuine issues of material fact exist with regards to 
whether Webb made an adequate disclosure to Galaxy Advertising's 
board of directors and when such a disclosure was actually made. 
Due to the existence of such genuine issues of material fact, the 
trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Webb. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Nicholson v. Evans, 642 P.2d 
721, 731, n. 2 (Utah 1982), recognized that a corporate director 
"who desires to acquire a corporate opportunity for his own 
benefit should make full disclosure and submit any questions of 
fact, such as the corporation's interest or financial or legal 
ability, to the impartial judgment of others." The determination 
of whether an adequate disclosure has, in fact, been made and 
whether the disclosure gave notice of the wrongs committed 
involve critical questions of fact that must be resolved by the 
trier of fact. The Oregon Supreme Court in Klinicki v. Lundgren, 
695 P.2d 906, 919-20 (Or. 1985), set forth the following standard 
for determining whether an adequate disclosure of a corporate 
opportunity has been made by a corporate director: 
(1) The director or principal senior 
executive must promptly offer the 
opportunity and disclose all material facts 
known regarding the opportunity to the 
disinterested directors or, if there is no 
disinterested director to the disinterested 
shareholders. If the director or principal 
senior executive learns of other material 
facts after such disclosure, the director or 
principal senior executive must disclose 
these additional facts in a like manner 
before personally taking the opportunity. 
(2) The director or principal senior 
executive may take advantage of the 
corporate opportunity only after full 
disclosure and only if the opportunity is 
rejected by a majority of the disinterested 
directors or, if there are no disinterested 
directors, by a majority of the 
disinterested shareholders Full 
disclosure to the appropriate corporate body 
is, however, an absolute condition precedent 
to the validity of any forthcoming rejection 
as well as to the availability to the 
director or principal senior executive of 
the defense of fairness. . . . Where a 
director or principal senior executive of a 
closed corporation appropriates a corporate 
opportunity without first fully disclosing 
the opportunity and offering it to the 
corporation, absent ratification, that 
director or principal senior executive holds 
the opportunity in trust for the 
corporation. 
In the instant case, genuine issues of fact exist as to 
whether the disclosure allegedly made by Webb, was a full and 
complete disclosure. In his deposition, Webb admits that he did 
not disclose to any one at Galaxy Advertising that he had an 
option to purchase a majority interest in Palmer Outdoor 
Advertising prior to the conclusion of the deal. (R. 1022 at pp. 
62, 73) Webb also admits in his deposition that the facts which 
he disclosed to the other directors may have constituted less than 
a full disclosure: 
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Did you ever go to the Hatch or the Glassman 
family and say, what I am doing is, 
basically, selling this to myself? 
A. That's not at all -- what you are saying 
is not what's happened, because I'm not 
selling it to myself. You are selling it to 
Palmer. I was not involved in the 
negotiation initially. 
Q. All right. Did you tell anyone at 
Galaxy or Orpheum that you had an option to 
purchase this company, half of this company 
that you were selling to Palmer? 
A. I did not. 
Q. But all based upon the business 
opportunity that you saw when Orpheum and 
Galaxy wanted to sell the Wyoming operation 
to Palmer and took and never advised your 
employer of it; is that right? 
A. I did advise him. 
Q. Prior to the consummation of the deal? 
A. No, I didn't. 
(R. 1022 at pp. 62, 73) (See also R. 1022 at p. 20-25, 60-62, 
70-75) 
The fact that other directors of Galaxy Advertising were 
not aware of Webb's purchase of an interest in Palmer Outdoor 
Advertising is further demonstrated in the deposition of Mr. 
George Hatch. Mr. Hatch also served as a director of Galaxy 
Advertising. In his deposition, Mr. Hatch noted that he did not 
have full knowledge of Webb's interest in Palmer Outdoor 
Advertising. (R. 1023 at pp. 8, 10, 32-35) Affidavits submitted 
by defendants in opposition to Webb's motion for partial summary 
judgment further demonstrate that Webb may not have made an 
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adequate disclosure of the corporate opportunity to the directors 
of Galaxy Advertising. (R. 607-11) 
The record before this Court demonstrates that genuine 
issues of material fact existed as to the nature of the alleged 
disclosure made by Webb to the board of directors of Galaxy 
Advertising. The trial court erred in finding as a matter of law 
that there was no conflict in the testimony as to when and how 
Webb disclosed the corporate opportunity to Galaxy Advertising's 
board of directors. As a result, the trial court erred in 
entering an order of partial summary judgment in favor of Webb, 
dismissing R.O.A.'s counterclaim for usurpation of a corporate 
opportunity. U.R.C.P. 56. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, R.O.A. respectfully requests 
that the order of the trial court granting summary judgment in 
favor of Webb and dismissing R.O.A.'s fourth cause of action be 
reversed and remanded to a trier of fact for a resolution of the 
genuine issues of material fact. 
Dated this /ft$ day of C/.^Ofjtf^ , 1989 
ih] 
Stephen J. Trayner 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Appellant Reagan 
DOUGLAS T. HALL 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
R.O.A. 
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I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellant was hand delivered, this /<£ ^  day 
1989, to the following: of $Afi(W , 
Val J. Christensen 
Victoria Brieant 
LeBOEUF, LAMB, LEIBY & MacRAE 
1000 Kearns Building 
136 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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ADDENDUM 
UTAH CODE ANN. §78-12-27 
Actions against directors or stockholers of 
corporations to recover a penalty or 
forfeiture imposed, or to enforce a 
liability created, by law must be brought 
within three years after the discovery, by 
the aggrieved party, of the facts upon which 
the penalty or forfeiture attached, or the 
liability accrued, and in case of actions 
against stockholders of a bank pursuant to 
levy of assessment to collect their 
statutory liability, such actions must be 
brought within three years after the levy of 
the assessment. 
RULE 9(h), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
In pleading the statute of limitations it is 
not necessary to state the facts showing the 
defense but it may be alleged generally that 
the cause of action is barred by the 
provisions of the statute relied on, 
referring to or describing such statutes 
specifically and definitively by section 
number, subsection designation, if any, or 
otherwise designating the provision relied 
upon sufficiently clearly to identify it. 
If such allegation is controverted, the 
party pleading the statute must establish, 
on the trial, the facts showing that the 
cause of action is so barred. (Emphasis 
added). 
RULE 56, UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
* * * 
(b) For defending party. A party against 
whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-
claim is asserted or a declaratory 
judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting 
affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
-Al-
Motions and proceedings thereon. The 
motion shall be served at least 10 days 
before the time fixed for the hearing. 
The adverse party prior to the day of 
hearing may serve opposing affidavits. 
The judgment sought shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. A summary 
judgment, interlocutory in character, may 
be rendered on the issue of liability 
alone although there is a genuine issue 
as to the amount of damage. 
* * * 
Form of affidavit; further testimony; 
defense required. Supporting and 
opposing affidavits shall be made on 
personal knowledge, shall set forth such 
facts as would be admissible in evidence, 
and shall show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the 
matters stated therein. Sworn or 
certified copies of all papers or parts 
thereof referred to in an affidavit shall 
be attached thereto or served therewith. 
The court may permit affidavits to be 
supplemented or opposed by depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, or further 
affidavits. When a motion for summary 
judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party 
may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of his pleading, but his 
response, by affidavit or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. If he does not 
so respond, summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against 
him. 
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